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Gravity models have been widely used to describe bilateral trade in goods. Portes and Rey [Portes, R., Rey,
H., 2005. The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Flows. Journal of International Economics, 65(2),
269–296.] applied this framework to cross-border equity flows and found that distance, which proxies
information asymmetries, is a surprisingly very large barrier to cross-border asset trade. We adopt a different
point of view and explore the complementarity between bilateral trade in goods and bilateral asset holdings in a
simultaneous gravity equations framework. Providing different instruments for both endogenous variables, we
show that a 10% increase in bilateral trade raises bilateral asset holdings by 6% to 7%. The reverse causality is
also significant, albeit smaller. Controlling for trade, the impact of distance on asset holdings is drastically
reduced.
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1. Introduction
The determinants of international asset holdings have recently received renewed attention.
Existing theories are mostly based on portfolio choice models and put forward risk-sharing as the
main motive for cross-border asset trade. However, this literature has been empirically extremely
disappointing. Indeed, Capital Asset Pricing Models predictions do not fit data on international
portfolios for two main reasons. First, those models were unable to replicate the size of the “home
bias” in country portfolios. If twenty years ago the segmentation of financial markets could well⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 1 4313 6326; fax: +33 1 4313 6310.
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invest much more in geographically close economies. Portes and Rey (2005) highlight the very
large impact of geography on cross-border equity flows: when physical distance is doubled, capital
flows are at least divided by two. To explain this surprising result, they argue that informational
asymmetries lead to higher transaction costs between distant economies. Moreover, as they point
out, since distant economies should be a better hedge for regional risk, this result is hard to justify
in a world where investors want to diversify their risk. Those results suggest that barriers to
international investment are still large, which is at odds with the popular view of intense and
widespread financial globalization.
This puzzling effect of distance on capital flows leads to the following question: does distance
directly affect international financial investment or does the negative impact of distance go
through another feature of globalization? In this paper, we argue that distance affects bilateral
asset holdings mainly through its impact on trade in goods. The argument is the following:
assume that trade in goods is a powerful determinant of asset portfolios. In that case, since
distance, understood as transport costs, reduces international trade in goods, it is likely to also
reduce bilateral asset holdings. Indeed, we show that the “distance puzzle” documented by Portes
and Rey is drastically reduced once we control for trade in goods. We find that the distance effect
on asset holdings is at least divided by two. The remaining challenge is to explain why asset
portfolios are induced by trade in goods.
Thus the second motivation of this paper is to analyze the complementarity between bilateral
trade in goods and bilateral financial claims. Indeed, there are good reasons to think that trade in
goods and trade in assets are closely related.2 First, due to information asymmetries, entrepreneurs
may learn about each other by trading goods and this information facilitates trade in financial assets
(and vice versa). Second, in the complete markets model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000),
trade costs (transportation costs or other barriers to international trade) induce a bias in investors
portfolios towards domestic securities and securities of their trading partners. As a consequence,
country portfolios would reflect trade patterns. Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2004) test this model in an
N-countries set-up and find the expected effects. However, the argument can easily be reversed: it
may be that transaction costs in financial markets (pure transaction costs or informational costs)
make agents exchange goods with countries with whom they can easily exchange securities. As a
consequence, international investment patterns would impact trade flows.
Are those relations between trade and finance of first-order magnitude: in other words, can we
still model international trade and international investment separately? We investigate this
question empirically and the answer is an unambiguous no: we find a very robust and significant
effect of trade on financial asset holdings. Moreover, the causality runs significantly in both ways
although the impact of asset holdings on trade in goods is smaller.
In line with Portes and Rey (2005), we consider the “home bias” as given and focus on the
determinants of geographical asset holdings using a “gravity equation” set-up3. We use a data set4
which breaks down international banking assets by countries5. We find that informational2 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Rose (2005), Rose and Spiegel (2002) and Serrat (2001) provide theoretical arguments
for such a complementarity between trade in goods and asset holdings.
3 “Gravity models” in which bilateral trade flows are explained by the size of the two partners and the distance between
them have been used since the 1960s and have provided a powerful predictor of bilateral trade flows.
4 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) consolidated International Banking Statistics.
5 We use stock data whereas Portes and Rey mainly use equity flow data, doing some robustness checks on US-centric
stock data.
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international asset holdings and standard financial motives have marginal effects. Those results
are consistent with the findings of Portes and Rey. However, we also show that bilateral trade
patterns are a very strong determinant of bilateral asset holdings.
In order to address the issue of reverse causality (between bilateral trade and bilateral asset
holdings), the use of good instruments is crucial. We use some geographical variables (excluding
distance6) and data on bilateral transport costs to instrument bilateral trade in goods. Another set
of instruments for bilateral financial asset holdings is required: using data on bilateral tax treaties
(fiscal taxation of foreign capital and bilateral agreements on double-taxation) and some insti-
tutional proximity variables, we provide reasonable instruments which allow us to properly
address the reverse causality issue. We estimate that a 10% increase in bilateral trade induces a 6%
to 7% increase in bilateral financial assets holdings so that the effect of trade in goods on asset
portfolios is quantitatively important. Conversely, a 10% increase in bilateral financial asset
holdings induces a 2.5% increase in bilateral trade. This empirical methodology also allows us to
identify the channel through which some variables affect bilateral trade (resp. bilateral holdings of
financial assets): as mentioned before, we find that distance affects country portfolios mainly
through its impact on trade. This suggests that globalization has gone much further on the
financial side than on the real side. Finally, as a by-product, we find some interesting results on the
“distance puzzle”7 in the gravity equation of international trade: depending on the methodology,
we reduce the impact of distance on trade in goods by around 20%. In order to test the robustness
of our findings, we reestimate our gravity models using the same empirical methodology but with
a different data set (the “Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey”) which breaks down securities
holdings by countries8. All our results are confirmed qualitatively and quantitatively.
In Section 2, we give some insights on the standard gravity models in international trade in
goods and international asset portfolios: although it is not the main point of the paper, we
reestimate the standard “gravity equations” for comparison purposes. In Section 3, we
properly address the question of the complementarity between international financial asset
holdings and trade flows and give the estimates for the system of two simultaneous gravity
equations. We analyze our main results and comment on the “correlation puzzle” that emerges
from the empirics: we find that, even after controlling for trade and distance, investors still
hold more financial assets from countries whose returns are positively correlated with their
domestic stock market9. We also discuss the links between our empirical results and the
existing theory on the complementarity between trade in goods and trade in assets. In
Section 4, we conclude.
2. Gravity models and the distance puzzle
The “gravity equation” has been extensively used in the international trade literature from both
a theoretical and an empirical point of view. The idea is very simple: import flows from country j
to country i (Importij) are explained by country sizes (GDP) and bilateral physical distance6 Since distance is likely to affect both endogenous variables.
7 What we call the “distance puzzle” is the fact that the negative impact of distance on bilateral trade is very large
relative to transport costs (see Grossman, 1998).
8 This data set is quite different from the BIS data set as it includes a larger part of securities and excludes cross-border
bank lending.
9 This surprising effect of the correlation also appeared in Portes and Rey (2005).
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one).
logðImportijÞ ¼ aþ klogðGDPiÞ þ logðGDPjÞ−logðDistijÞ þ ij
Portes and Rey (2005) apply this rule to asset trade and show that bilateral cross-border equity
flows can also be described by market size and physical distance. From now on, a “gravity
equation” refers to this type of rule.
2.1. Gravity models for international trade in goods
There is a huge theoretical literature in trade, starting with Anderson (1979), based on a
“gravity equation” framework. We first briefly give the theoretical underpinnings that will
motivate our empirical specifications.
2.1.1. Theoretical background
We assume an exogenous number of varieties ni produced in each country i (1≤ i≤N). A
representative consumer in country i maximizes its utility which depends on the flow of
consumption cijh of all varieties h produced in country j (the elasticity of substitution across goods
is assumed to be constant equal to σN1). We assume symmetry among varieties within a country
such that cijh=cij for all h.
Ci ¼
XN
j¼1
Xnj
h¼1
c
r−1
r
ijh
 ! r
r−1
¼
XN
j¼1
njc
r−1
r
ij
 ! r
r−1
A good imported from country j is bought by an agent in country i at price pij=(1+τij)pj where
τij is an iceberg-cost that features trade costs on international goods markets
10.
The budget constraint of agent i is then:
PN
j¼1ð1þ sijÞpjnjcij ¼ Yi ¼ PiCi (where Yi denotes
the aggregate revenues of agent i and Pi ¼
PN
j¼1 njð1þ sijÞ1−rp1−rj
h i 1
1−r is the aggregate price
index in country i).
This leads to the following demand function for goods produced in country j:
cij ¼ Ci pjð1þ sijÞPi
 −r
We deduce the value of imports from country j to country i:
Importij ¼ YiPr−1i njp1−rj ð1þ sijÞ1−r
Taking logs:
logðImportijÞ ¼ logðYiÞ þ logðnjÞ þ ðr−1ÞlogðPiÞ þ ð1−rÞlogðpjÞ þ ð1−rÞlogð1þ sijÞ10 Where τii is assumed to be zero.
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other control variables Zij
T, we easily deduce the standard “gravity equation” model:
logðImportijÞ ¼ aþ logðYiÞ þ logðnjÞ þ ðr−1ÞlogðPiÞ þ ð1−rÞlogðpjÞ−blogðDistijÞ
þ gZTij þ eTij
Previous works on “gravity equation” have shown some relevant determinants of trade costs:
Glick and Rose (2002) and Frankel and Rose (2002) show that Trade Agreements and
Currency Unions boost trade. Rauch (1999) puts forward the informational content of
international trade costs. In other words, trade between people who know each other is less
costly and as a consequence people who belong to the same social networks trade more. For
example, countries which share a common language or had colonial links should trade more:
the data confirm his argument. Combes et al. (2005) also provide some insights about the
informational content of trade costs using French data. Anderson and Marcouiller (1999) show
the importance of the contractual environment and find that “trade is reduced in response to
hidden transaction costs associated with the insecurity of international exchange and a lack of
contract enforcement.”
2.1.2. Estimation strategies
Following our theoretical model, we propose three estimation strategies.
Specification (1). We proxy market sizes variables (Yi) and (nj) by countries GDP and leave
price indices in the error term to estimate:
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
¼ a−blog Distij
 þ gZ1Tij þ e1Tij
We decide to normalize bilateral imports by the product of countries GDPs instead of putting
market sizes as explanatory variables as it is usually done: this avoids eventual misspecification
due to the endogeneity of GDPs11; however none of the following results depend on this
choice.
This specification has the main advantage to keep variability in the three dimensions (country i,
country j and bilateral dimension). However, as underlined by Anderson and VanWincoop (2003),
trade costs do matter for consumption prices Pi which might affect the estimated coefficient on
trade cost variables.
Specification (2). We add importer country fixed-effects (and drop importer specific factors) to
estimate:
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
¼ ai−blog Distij
 þ gZ2Tij þ e2Tij
This is our preferred estimation since the number of parameters to estimate is reasonable
according to the size of our data set and allows us to control for trade costs appearing in the price
index of the importer.11 This is equivalent to an estimation where the elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to market sizes are constrained
to one. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
27A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51Specification (3). We control for fixed-effects in both dimensions (as recommended by
Hummels, 1999; Feenstra, 2003).
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
¼ ai þ aj  blog Distij
 þ gZ3Tij þ e3Tij
This estimation is fully consistent with the theoretical model and control for “multilateral
resistance factors” (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003, 2004). However, the number of
coefficients is very large, which raises multicollinearity issues12.
2.1.3. The “distance puzzle”
The “gravity equation” has been extensively estimated with different sets of regressors;
however the coefficient on physical distance is systematically very high (β between 0.8 and 1.2 in
many regressions): therefore, everything else equal, trade drops sharply with distance (a 10%
increase in distance reduces trade by 8%). This estimate is huge compared to what transport costs
would suggest (see Grossman, 1998 or Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003) and has not decreased
over time (although transportation costs have diminished). One can argue that the “gravity model”
might be misspecified: an omitted variable (correlated with physical distance) might lead to an
overestimation of β but the difficulty consists in finding the missing variable. The right one has
not been found yet. Empirical works based on network effects (Rauch, 1999) or informational
asymmetries (Portes and Rey, 2005)13 help to solve the “Distance Puzzle” but β remains very
high.
2.2. Gravity models for international financial claims
The adaptation of the “gravity equation” framework to describe international trade in assets
is much more recent. The seminal paper is Portes and Rey (2005)14 which shows that a
“gravity equation” explains cross-border equity transactions at least as well as trade in goods
transactions. They find that physical distance is also strongly negatively correlated with asset trade
flows and argue that distance is a proxy for some informational costs. Using some proxies for
information flows (telephone traffic between countries, newspaper circulation, bank branches),
they confirm that informational flows enhance significantly asset trade15. Although those
information variables reduce the coefficient on distance, the latter remains high and very
significant16: β is around 0.7 in most specifications which makes the “distance puzzle” even worse
than for trade in goods. As underlined by Portes and Rey, financial assets are “weightless” and are
not subject to transportation costs. Moreover, if investors want to diversify their risk, they should
bias their portfolio towards distant countries assets as returns in those countries should be less
correlated with domestic returns.12 Indeed, the number of importers is restricted by our data set on financial assets, so that our fixed-effects αj are
estimated over at most 19 points.
13 Portes and Rey reduce significantly the puzzle for a sample of industrialized countries: their estimate of β ranges from
0.3 to 0.55.
14 Buch (2005) and Papaioannaou (2004) test a Gravity Model for Bilateral Banking Flows and Lane and Milesi-Feretti
(2004) for Bilateral Equity Holdings.
15 Hau (2001), Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Huberman (2001) also provide empirical evidence that informational
costs and/or familiarity effects have a large impact on asset portfolios and price.
16 β is decreasing from 0.88 to 0.67.
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investment (Buch, 2005; Mody et al., 2002; Loungani et al., 2002): such a model accounts well for
bilateral FDI flows. However, we think that the determinants of bilateral FDI flows are quite
different from those of portfolio and debt flows. Especially, we should be very cautious with the
impact of distance on FDI flows as FDI can be seen as a substitute for trade flows.
2.2.1. Theoretical background
From a theoretical standpoint, Martin and Rey (2004) propose a model where a “gravity
equation” of international trade in assets emerges. In their set-up, international trade in assets and
international stock holdings coincide. We think that it is more natural to theoretically derive a
“gravity equation” of stock holdings and the transposition to asset flows is not obvious. However,
as underlined by Portes and Rey, when data on bilateral stocks and flows exist, it is easy to check
that they are highly correlated.
We simplify Martin and Rey (2004) modeling by assuming an exogenous number of projects
in each country17. Each country i (0≤ i≤N) is populated with ni risk averse agents. In the first
period, agent h in country i (denoted hi) is endowed with yi units of traded goods (the numeraire)
and a risky project. She consumes part of her endowment, sells shares of her project and buys
shares of other agents' projects in the first period. The number of shares for each project is
normalized to one. Agents in country i pay pj(1+τij) for a share of a project run in country j (τij is
an iceberg cost that features the frictions on international financial markets)18.
There are L equally likely states of nature in the second period. One project in country i run by
agent h pays δmhidhi=δmhidi in state m∈{1,…, L} where δmhi=1 if hi=m and zero otherwise. This
stochastic environment makes assets imperfect substitutes and will create a demand for other
agents' assets in order to diversify their risks.
The total number of projects is M=∑j=1N nj. We assume MbL, so that markets are incomplete.
Agent h in country i maximizes the following two-period utility subject to a budget constraint
(where xkj
hi is the number of shares bought by agent h in country i to agent k in country j):
max
c1;hi ; x
hi
kj
 
1VjVN ; 1VkjVnj
 	 c1;hi þ bE c2;hi
1− 1σ
1− 1r
 ! 	
s:t: : c1;hi þ
XN
j¼1
Xnj
kj¼1
pjð1þ sijÞxhikj ¼ yi þ pi
Symmetry insures xkj=xj, and we can rewrite the maximization as:
max
c1;hi ;ðx
hi
j Þ1VjVNf g

c1;hi þ bð11r Þ L
P
j¼1
nj
N
ðdjxhij

1 1r
	
s:t: : c1hi þ
XN
j¼1
njpjð1þ sijÞxhij ¼ yi þ pi17 Which equals the number of agent investors.
18 We assume: τii=0. As shown by Martin and Rey, we also could apply the cost of holding foreign securities on the
dividend stream without affecting the results as long as frictions are iceberg-type.
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country j19:
xhij
 
¼ j
Lr−1
ðdjÞr−1
½ pjð1þ sijÞr
This gives the following aggregate asset holdings (Assetij) of country i from country j:
Assetij ¼ ni pjð1þ sijÞnjxhij
 
¼ j ninjð1þ sijÞr−1
dj
Lpj
 r−1
Introducing the expected gross return (Rj) on assets in country j: Rj ¼ djLpj, this naturally leadsto the following “gravity equation”:
logðAssetijÞ ¼ logðninjÞ−ðr−1Þlogð1þ sijÞ þ ðr−1ÞlogðRjÞ þ logðjÞ þ eAij
The first-term reflect market sizes of both countries, the second term is related to trading costs
in financial markets and the third term is a “return chasing” component.
Of course, the main question remains to exhibit determinants of transaction costs (τij) on
financial markets (pure transaction costs, taxes on the repatriation of dividends, informational
costs, foreign-exchange costs…). Like Portes and Rey (2005), we use bilateral distance and other
proxies for those bilateral frictions:
logð1þ sijÞ ¼ aþ qlogðDistijÞ þ /ZAij þ mij
2.2.2. Estimation strategies
Following our estimation strategy for international trade in goods, we propose three
identification strategies.
Specification (1). We proxy market size ni (i.e. the number of projects in country i) by the GDP
of country i (GDPi) and returns in country j by the log of the average gross return in US$ over the
period 1990–2001 (Retj) and estimate
20:
log
Assetij
GDPiGDPj
 
¼ a−blog Distij
 þ gAZ1Aij þ dRetj þ e1Aij
Specification (2). We control for country i fixed-effects: indeed, in the model the number of
investors is equal to the number of projects but it is likely that some discrepancy exists between
those two terms such that GDPi is not a convenient proxy for market size of the capital
exporter21.
log
Assetij
GDPiGDPj
 
¼ ai−blog Distij
 þ gAZ2Aij þ dRetj þ e2Aij
19 Where κ=β σ/L is a constant.
20 Like for bilateral imports, we normalize our asset holdings by the product of market sizes. However our results do not
depend on this normalization choice.
21 Financial wealth of country i would be a better proxy but it is unfortunately non-observable.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Median Min Max N
log
Assetij
GDPiGDPj
 
−18.662 1.87 −18.597 −24.931 −12.658 987
log
CPIAssetij
GDPiGDPj
 
−19.359 2.391 −19.100 −27.73 −11.418 1005
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
−18.954 1.512 −18.885 −24.848 −13.598 1152
log
Exportsij
GDPiGDPj
 
−18.791 1.336 −18.780 −23.605 −13.678 1152
log(Distanceij) 8.249 1.097 8.693 4.025 9.884 1159
TranspCostij 1.150 0.23 1.156 0.134 1.571 1098
(TranspCostij)
2 1.382 0.496 1.352 0.018 2.470 1098
AreaiAreaj 24.738 2.610 24.550 16.840 32.956 1159
Retj 0.027 0.099 0.040 −0.314 0.274 1159
Correlationij 0.311 0.219 0.313 −0.269 0.872 1159
Corruptioni −7.716 1.297 −7.7 −5.2 −9.7 1159
Corruptionj −5.595 2.382 −4.9 −1.6 −9.7 1140
InterestTaxij 8.505 7.368 10 0 40 1155
DividendTaxij 13.429 8.046 15 0 40 1155
FiscalTreatyij 15.862 0.450 14 0 76 1159
30 A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51Specification (3). We add fixed-effects in both dimensions:
log
Assetij
GDPiGDPj
 
¼ ai þ aj−blog Distij
 þ gAZ3Aij þ e3Aij
2.3. Empirics
2.3.1. Data presentation
Our data set concerns the year 200122 (Table 1).
In order to estimate a “gravity equation” of international trade, we use data on bilateral trade
flows from the CHELEM data set (CEPII, Paris). The dependent variable (log(Importij)) is the
log of imports from country j to country i. Because of sample restrictions in our data set of
country financial assets, we restrict our data set on trade flows to 19 importer countries (i) and 62
exporter countries ( j)23. Using worldwide data, trade flows are usually found to be zero for an
important number of country pairs, which makes interesting to consider fixed cost in
international trade in addition to marginal effects of iceberg-type costs; however, because of our
sample restrictions in our data on financial assets, we only consider imports towards relatively
rich countries and we do not have zeroes in our data set. As a consequence, we are not able to
model the effect of fixed cost on international trade and restrict our attention on the intensive
margin of trade due to iceberg-type trade costs.
For the “gravity equation” of bilateral international asset holdings, we use data on bilateral
banking financial assets in 2001: the Bank of International Settlements issues quarterly the
international claims of its reporting banks on individual countries, geographically broken down
by nationality of reporting banks24. The dependent variable (log(Assetij)) is the log of financial22 Although using panel data would be more appropriate, we are restricted by our data set on international financial
claims. Testing the robustness of our result using panel data is left for future work.
23 For a country list, see appendix.
24 See http://www.bis.org/statistics/histstats10.htm. To get more robust results, we average quarterly data for portfolio
stocks in 2001. We do not exploit the time series aspect of this data set because there is too much variations in the reporting
conventions. In particular the data set was initially built to monitor risks due to emerging economies and the claims held on
developed countries are only reported since 1999, which makes a rather short time span for a stocks data set.
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data on the banking sector to estimate our “gravity model”. However we can justify our choice
with three main arguments: first, the reliability of the data set since it is often a very difficult task
to collect data on stocks; second, banking financial assets do not include Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and as we said before there are good reasons to think that FDI does not obey the same
determinant as a standard geographical portfolio25; finally, to explain portfolio flows, we have to
consider borrowing and lending since it is the main part of international investment (see Kraay
et al., 2005)26. The main drawback of our data set is that we cannot distinguish different types of
assets (especially between equities, bonds and cross-border bank lending): indeed, it could be
that informational costs differ for different types of assets (see Portes et al., 2001)27. Table 2
gives some insights on the nature of international banking assets: a disaggregation by sector
shows that banking assets are for half interbank assets, the rest being corporate sector financing
(35%) and public sector financing (15%). A disaggregation by types of assets shows that a big
part is loan and deposit (around two thirds) but a non-negligible part consist in negotiable
securities (bonds and equities28). Unfortunately such a disaggregation is not available in the
bilateral dimension.
We use “importer” and “exporter” countries' GDPs (GDPi and GDPj) to correct for market
sizes29. The product of GDPs will be used to normalize our dependent variables30.
The distance between the two main cities is used for bilateral distance (Distij)
31. In the Gravity
Model of Trade in Goods, we add other geographical variables: Borderij, which is unity if country
i and j have a common border and zero otherwise, Islandsij which is the number of islands in the
country pair, AreaiAreaj, the (log of the) product of the countries' areas, and LandLockij the
number of landlocked countries in the country pair.
We construct Trade Zone dummies when both countries belong to a Trade agreement in 2001.
We have three dummy variables: NAFTAij for the NAFTA Agreement, ECij for the European
Community and APECij for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. We do not consider currency
unions because the Euro Zone is the only one in our data set and the effect is already captured by
the European Community dummy.
To take into account the informational determinants of trade in goods and assets, we use a
“Common Language” dummy (Languageij) if country i and country j share the same language and
a “Colonial Link” dummy (ColonialDepij) if country j has been a colony of country i (or vice
versa).25 Moreover, banking assets include a marginal part of trade credit (as it is mainly inter-firm finance) which avoid any
spurious relationship between asset holdings and goods trade. For France, we have a disaggregation of foreign banking
assets by types of assets: the share of trade credit is 0.05% of total foreign banking assets.
26 Especially in developing countries where bond and equity markets are underdeveloped, see Table 2.
27 However, we have for some countries (namely France and UK) a certain level of disaggregation between bonds and
equities and cross-border lending. Geographical allocation of different types of assets has very similar patterns.
28 For some countries, namely France and UK, we know that around half of total securities are equities.
29 Some might argue that market capitalization of the Destination Country and Consumption of the Source Country
could be better proxies for the mass term of the Gravity Equation of Asset Holdings (e.g. Martin and Rey, 2004) but none
of our results were affected by this choice. Moreover the choice of GDPs is more consistent with theoretical foundations.
30 We first added GDP/Capita in the Asset Trade Regression to control for the development of financial markets but the
results were mixed because of interaction with our corruption variable. However, none of our results depend on this
specification.
31 We first added a “Time Difference” variable to control for different working hours of stock markets but we dropped it
because it did not modify any of the results.
Table 2
International banking assets breakdown by types of assets and sectors (in billion USD, 2001)
Total assets Loans and deposits Bonds and equities Loans and deposits
(%)
Bonds and equities
(%)
Developed
Europe a 3487.3 2363.0 1124.2 67 33
North America 2387.5 1684.9 702.5 70 30
Asia-Oceania 632.0 519.0 113.0 82 18
Emerging
Africa 42.6 37.3 5.4 87 13
Asia b 255.4 213.6 41.7 83 17
Eastern Europe 142.2 114.2 28.1 80 20
South America c 259.0 193.3 65.7 74 26
Financial
Centers d
1086.2 965.8 120.5 89 11
Total 8292.3 6091.1 2201.2 73 27
Disaggregation by sector (%) Banking sector Public sector Corporate sector Unallocated
48 16 35 1
a Excluding Luxembourg, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
b Excluding Hong Kong and Singapore.
c Excluding Panama.
d Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
32 A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51Following Anderson et al. (1999) and Papaioannou (2004)32, we use an index of corruption for
the “importer” and the “exporter” countries (Corruptioni and Corruptionj) since it is likely that
hidden bribes reduce transactions in international markets. This index is developed by Trans-
parency International33 and gives some insights on the degree of corruption as seen by business
people, academics and risk analysts.
We also add some fiscal and legal determinants of transaction costs in financial markets:
• First, we use a dummy for the proximity of legal systems from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). We
distinguish between “common law” systems (or “English law”), “French law”, “German law”
and “Swedish law”. The dummy variable Legalij equals one when source and destination
countries have the same legal system. Indeed, legal system similarities might also reduce
information asymmetries and contracting costs.
• Second, we use bilateral tax treaties34 to describe the taxation of foreign capital. Although most of
the countries we study have a residence-based tax system, they charge withholding taxes when
foreigners repatriate dividends, capital gains or interests. To limit double-taxation, several bilateral
tax treaties regulate those withholding taxes. We built two different variables that describe bilateral
tax on dividends (and capital gains) and on interests (from loans, deposits or debt securities), resp.
DividendTaxij and InterestTaxij, in percent. Both of them should affect banking assets
35.When such
tax treaty does not exist, we use the regulatory tax rate applied to foreigners.
• Third, we suppose that countries that have old fiscal agreements should exchange more in
financial markets for historical reasons. We add the age of the fiscal treaty (if there is one, zero32 Papaioannou (2004) finds a large impact of institutional quality on cross-border bank flows.
33 http://www.transparency.org, “Corruption Perception Index”.
34 http://www.ibfd.org.
35 Those taxes are far from being negligible, ranging from 0% for some agreements to 40%, and as we mentioned
before, equity shares are a non-negligible part of banking assets.
33A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51otherwise) to catch this effect (FiscalTreatyij). We also add a variable TaxHavenj to control for
capital recipient countries with very favourable fiscal treatment. We consider three Tax Havens
in our sample, namely Switzerland, Luxembourg and Panama.
Finally, we use stock market data (monthly stock prices in US$ from 1990 to 2001 of the main
stock market index of the country36) to compute the log of the average gross stock returns of
countryj (Retj) and the empirical correlation over the period between the stock returns of the
country pair (Correlationij). If we assume that diversification motives matter for asset allocations,
we might expect that countries would hold a higher share of assets with respect to countries whose
assets are poor substitutes of the domestic ones (i.e. whose stock returns are weakly correlated with
domestic returns).
2.3.2. Estimation of a gravity model for trade in goods
Depending on the specification used, we estimate the following regressions where Zij
kT are sets
of control variables37:
(1) logð ImportGDPiGDPjÞ ¼ a−blog Distij
 þ gZ1Tij þ e1Tij
(2) logð ImportijGDPiGDPjÞ ¼ ai−blog Distij
 þ gZ2Tij þ e2Tij
(3) logð ImportijGDPiGDPjÞ ¼ ai þ aj−blog Distij
 þ gZ3Tij þ e3Tij
Our estimates of the usual “gravity models” of trade are shown in Table 3. They support the
consensus view of a strong and significant impact of physical distance on trade in goods; β is
estimated between 0.7 and 0.8 depending on the specification: this figure is in line with previous
studies and as we already mentioned surprisingly high. Adding “Language”, “Colonial Link” and
“Trade Zone” dummies does not solve the “distance puzzle” although those variables are
significant38.
2.3.3. Estimation of a gravity model for trade in assets
We estimate the following regression where Zij
kA is a set of control variables:
(1) logð AssetijGDPi GDPjÞ ¼ a−blog Distij
 þ gAZ1Aij þ dRetj þ e1Aij
(2) logð AssetijGDPi GDPjÞ ¼ ai−blog Distij
 þ gAZ2Aij þ dRetj þ e2Aij
(3) logð AssetijGDPi GDPjÞ ¼ ai þ aj−blog Distij
 þ gAZ3Aij þ e3Aij
Our estimation of the standard “gravity equation” is presented in Table 4.
As in Portes and Rey, we find a strong negative impact of physical distance on asset trade; β is
estimated between 0.4 and 0.7 depending on the specification39 and the “distance puzzle” is
worse than for trade flows. Adding “Language”, “Colonial Link” and “Legal System” dummies as
proxies for information flows helps to solve the puzzle (in our most complete specification, β is
equal to 0.45) but β remains very high and significant. We confirm here the importance of36 Most data on stock returns are from Martin and Rey (2002).
37 Zij
1T includes both importers and exporters fixed factors that might affect international trade in goods, whereas we drop
importers fixed factors in the set Zij
2T and both importers and exporters fixed factors in the set Zij
3T to keep only dyads
variables.
38 Surprisingly, trade zone dummies are not very robust, the APEC effect being the only robust (and positive) effect; β is
consistently estimated around 0.7–0.8.
39 For comparison, in Portes and Rey, β is around 0.6 in most specifications.
Table 3
Gravity models for bilateral imports
log Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
log(Distij) −0.75⁎⁎⁎
(0.075)
−0.741⁎⁎⁎
(0.073)
−0.741⁎⁎⁎
(0.082)
−0.748⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
−0.748⁎⁎⁎
(0.078)
−0.72⁎⁎⁎
(0.084)
−1.041⁎⁎⁎
(0.088)
−0.823⁎⁎⁎
(0.107)
Borderij 0.043⁎⁎⁎
(01.62)
0.214
(0.166)
0.17
(0.167)
0.518⁎⁎⁎
(0.182)
0.349⁎
(0.182)
0.362⁎⁎
(0.181)
0.286⁎
(0.16)
0.238
(0.163)
AreaiAreaj −0.084⁎⁎⁎
(0.03)
−0.09⁎⁎⁎
(0.032)
−0.106⁎⁎⁎
(0.038)
−0.047
(0.037)
−0.047
(0.04)
−0.066
(0.047)
−0.05
(0.071)
−0.059
(0.07)
Islandsij 0.129
(0.134)
0.107
(0.138)
−0.006
(0.152)
0.597⁎⁎
(0.241)
0.588⁎⁎
(0.232)
0.461⁎
(0.239)
0.442⁎⁎
(0.178)
−1.28⁎⁎⁎
(0.326)
LandLockij −0.374⁎⁎⁎
(0.115)
−0.376⁎⁎⁎
(0.118)
−0.368⁎⁎⁎
(0.126)
−0.115
(0.175)
−0.082
(0.18)
−0.025
(0.192)
0.216
(0.133)
−0.161
(0.13)
ColonialDepij 0.528⁎⁎⁎
(0.171)
0.585⁎⁎⁎
(0.172)
0.66⁎⁎⁎
(0.165)
0.696⁎⁎⁎
(0.168)
0.452⁎⁎⁎
(0.145)
Languageij 0.429⁎⁎⁎
(0.131)
0.366⁎⁎⁎
(0.128)
0.208
(0.135)
0.107
(0.132)
0.276⁎⁎⁎
(0.104)
Corruptionj −0.001
(0.035)
0.001
(0.037)
0.001
(0.034)
0.005
(0.036)
−0.333⁎⁎⁎
(0.049)
Corruptioni −0.031
(0.028)
−0.048⁎
(0.029)
−0.035
(0.094)
−0.118
(0.09)
0.503⁎⁎⁎
(0.175)
ECij 0.012 (167) 0.015
(0.182)
0.025
(0.186)
NAFTAij 0.387 (0.5) −0.013
(0.442)
0.766
(0.705)
APECij 0.0982⁎⁎⁎
(0.283)
1.429⁎⁎⁎
(0.309)
1.198⁎⁎⁎
(0.199)
N Obs. 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R2 0.427 0.447 0.466 0.197 0.511 0.543 0.704 0.728
Observations are clustered within destination country. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by ⁎ (resp. ⁎⁎ and ⁎⁎⁎).
34 A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51information as our three variables boost significantly international asset holdings (more than
goods trade) and help to reduce the impact of distance.
Our fiscal variables are significant with the expected contribution40: the effects of fiscality are
statistically significant and strong. Indeed, a 10 percentage points increase of bilateral dividend
withholding tax leads to a 20% decrease in bilateral banking claims.
As expected, our measure of returns affects positively portfolio shares41 and corruption
reduces significantly asset holdings (probably by reducing returns or by increasing risks).
2.3.3.1. The “correlation puzzle”. More surprisingly, even when we control for distance and
informational variables42, we find that a country will hold more financial assets from a country
whose stock market is highly correlated with his own one. This effect is quite large, very
significant and absolutely at odds with the finance literature predictions. Portes and Rey (2005)
also found that diversification motives do not play a large role in explaining asset trade between40 The age of the fiscal treaty is the less robust one.
41 According to the theoretical model, this means that the asset demand elasticity with respect to asset prices σ is greate
than one. Throughout the paper, our estimates suggest a σ between 2 and 3, depending on the specification.
42 We also tried to control for GDP/Capita to be sure that this result was not just catching the fact that rich countries
have higher correlations and higher trading volumes.r
Table 4
Gravity models for bilateral banking claims
log Assetij
GDPiGDPj
 
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
log(Distij) −0.756⁎⁎⁎
(0.094)
−0.476⁎⁎⁎
(0.073)
−0.445⁎⁎⁎
(0.072)
−0.661⁎⁎⁎
(0.098)
−0.447⁎⁎⁎
(0.075)
−0.401⁎⁎⁎
(0.072)
−0.892⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
−0.74⁎⁎⁎
(0.083)
Retj 2.373⁎
(1.31)
0.894
(1.091)
0.923
(0.988)
2.285⁎
(1.329)
0.659
(1.145)
0.709
(0.984)
ColonialDepij 1.486⁎⁎⁎
(0.196)
1.494⁎⁎⁎
(0.198)
1.64⁎⁎⁎
(0.225)
1.654⁎⁎⁎
(0.229)
1.448⁎⁎⁎
(0.23)
Languageij 0.351⁎
(0.193)
0.315
(0.197)
0.285
(0.224)
0.257
(0.225)
0.269⁎
(0.163)
Corruptionj −0.142⁎⁎⁎
(0.046)
−0.093
(0.06)
−0.194⁎⁎⁎
(0.046)
−0.126⁎⁎
(0.059)
Corruptioni −0.094⁎⁎
(0.038)
−0.085⁎⁎
(0.038)
−0.282
(0.263)
−0.309
(0.26)
Legalij 0.654⁎⁎⁎
(0.123)
0.637⁎⁎⁎
(0.117)
0.551⁎⁎⁎
(0.141)
0.532⁎⁎⁎
(0.134)
0.462⁎⁎⁎
(0.121)
FiscalTreatyij 0.006
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.01⁎⁎
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.004)
DividendTaxij −0.023⁎⁎
(0.011)
−0.022⁎⁎
(0.011)
−0.024⁎⁎
(0.01)
−0.022⁎⁎
(0.01)
−0.025⁎⁎
(0.01)
InterestTaxij −0.018
(0.012)
−0.02⁎
(0.012)
−0.012
(0.011)
−0.013
(0.011)
0.004
(0.01)
TaxHeavenj 1.495⁎⁎⁎
(0.341)
1.497⁎⁎⁎
(0.339)
1.471⁎⁎
(0.708)
1.445⁎⁎
(0.699)
Correlationij 1.079⁎⁎
(0.53)
1.583⁎⁎⁎
(0.55)
−0.123
(0.537)
N Obs. 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R2 0.209 0.409 0.417 0.374 0.537 0.553 0.649 0.703
Observations are clustered within destination country. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by ⁎ (resp. ⁎⁎ and ⁎⁎⁎).
35A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51industrialized countries and we confirm their results using a larger sample of countries43. We refer
to this result as the “Correlation Puzzle”.
3. Asset portfolios and trade in goods complementarity?
3.1. A misspecified regression?
Our previous results and especially the strong impact of distance let us think that both “gravity
equations”might be misspecified. The idea is very simple: let us suppose that for any reason trade
in goods enhances asset trade (and vice versa). Then, omitting bilateral trade in goods in the
“gravity equation” for international asset holdings is likely to lead to a bias in the estimates of
some coefficients. Especially, we might expect that the coefficient β on distance in the “Asset
Regression” is biased upwards as distance affects negatively bilateral trade in goods. Put
differently, part of the effect of distance on international banking portfolios might go through
trade. On the other hand, in the “gravity model” for trade in goods, there is no reason to exclude43 Everything else equal, diversification should be a larger motive for asset trade once we include emerging countries
since they provide larger diversification opportunities.
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Fig. 1. Assets versus imports.
36 A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51bilateral banking claims. Fig. 1 showing the strong correlation between Asset Holdings and
Goods Trade is in line with this argument.
In other words, if trade in goods and asset holdings are complementary, estimating
independently the previous gravity models is not appropriate. The OLS estimator of the gravity
models including financial asset holdings in the “trade in goods model” (resp. trade in the
“financial assets model”) confirms this intuition (see Table 5, first column): trade seems to affect
positively geographical portfolios (and respectively countries that have bilateral financial
relationships trade more). These are first-order effects since for example, a 10% increase in
bilateral trade leads to a 3% increase in bilateral banking claims. We get that a large part of the
impact of physical distance on bilateral asset holdings goes through its impact on trade. On the
other hand, its impact on trade in goods is a bit smaller.
Of course the variables we consider in those estimations are jointly determined and the
estimation may suffer from an endogeneity bias. Still, what we show here is that we should take
into account the complementarity of asset holdings and trade in goods in our gravity modeling.
3.2. Theoretical motivation
From a theoretical point of view, the channel through which bilateral trade affects country
portfolios is not clear. We propose to give some insights on the theoretical explanation. Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2000) and Rose and Spiegel (2002) provide two different channels through which
barriers to international trade in goods would reduce bilateral asset holdings44.
3.2.1. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000): “The consumption hedging story”
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) argue that adding trade costs into a complete markets model with
two countries (where agents can insure their consumption basket with Arrow-Debreu Securities)
helps to explain the “home bias” puzzle. In their model, trade costs imply a bias towards domestic
securities since trade costs reduce investors incentives to repatriate their dividends from foreign
assets. They provide their model to solve the “home bias puzzle”45. However, a simple extension44 We are aware that there is an extensive literature on FDI that shows that it might be either complementary to or
substitute for Trade but we do not want to go much into it as we consider FDI as a very different type of asset (for a
survey see Venables, 1999, 2000).
45 In a dynamic set-up, Serrat (2001) also provides theoretical evidence that frictions in goods market lead to home bias
in portfolios: frictions are captured by the existence of non-traded goods but this delivers the same kind of predictions for
portfolios.
Table 5
Simultaneous gravity models for bilateral imports and bilateral banking claims
Naive OLS System OLS Instru nt set #1 Instrument set #2
Assets Trade Assets Trade Asset Trade Assets Trade
Specification 1
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
  0.333⁎⁎⁎
(0.071)
0.733
(0.105
0.757⁎⁎⁎
(0.111)
log
Assetsij
GDPiGDPj
  0.149⁎⁎⁎
(0.034)
0.239⁎⁎⁎
(0.095)
0.378⁎⁎⁎
(0.142)
log(Distij) −0.476⁎⁎⁎
(0.073)
−0.741⁎⁎⁎
(0.082)
−0.229⁎⁎⁎
(0.085)
−0.68⁎⁎⁎
(0.084)
−0.20 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.087
−0.698⁎⁎⁎
(0.092)
−0.211⁎⁎
(0.085)
−0.703⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
Expected
bias
−0.27
(0.122
−0.054
(0.055)
−0.298
(0.118)
−0.115
(0.032)
Sargan
Stat. a
1.104
(0.576
3.651
(0.302)
0.528
(0.768)
2.052
(0.562)
N Obs 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R2 0.409 0.466 0.444 0.489 0.454 0.476 0.454 0.477
Specification 2
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
  0.279⁎⁎⁎
(0.076)
0.606
(0.167
0.638⁎⁎⁎
(0.177)
log
Assetsij
GDPiGDPj
  0.134⁎⁎⁎
(0.038)
0.234⁎⁎
(0.094)
0.355⁎⁎⁎
(0.138)
log(Distij) −0.447⁎⁎⁎
(0.075)
−0.72⁎⁎⁎
(0.084)
−0.253⁎⁎⁎
(0.086)
−0.67⁎⁎⁎
(0.088)
−0.23 ⁎⁎
(0.01)
−0.684⁎⁎⁎
(0.095)
−0.244⁎⁎⁎
(0.097)
−0.69⁎⁎⁎
(0.093)
Expected
bias
−0.22
(0.155
−0.053
(0.055)
−0.251
(0.148)
−0.108
(0.032)
Sargan
Stat. a
3.108
(211)
1.006
(0.8)
1.949
(0.377)
0.541
(0.91)
N Obs. 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R2 0.537 0.543 0.559 0.558 0.555 0.552 0.556 0.553
Observations are clustered within destination country. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical signi ance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by ⁎
(resp. ⁎⁎ and ⁎⁎⁎).
a P-values in parenthesis.
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38 A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51with many countries (and bilateral trade costs) would lead to a bias towards securities of trading
partners (relative to other countries). Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2004) provide an N-country
generalization of Obstfeld and Rogoff's model. In their model, trade in goods enhances asset
portfolios as equity biases reflect in large measure goods market biases.
3.2.2. Rose and Spiegel (2002): “The sovereign risk story”
Rose and Spiegel (2002) propose a model of international lending where bilateral lending is
sustainable because of bilateral trade in goods. Their paper is in line with the “sovereign debt” literature
(Bulow and Rogoff (1989); see also Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a survey). Because debt contracts
cannot be enforced internationally, creditors lend to foreign countries only when they can threaten the
debtor with a credible sanction in case of default46. In their model, penalties go through trade: creditors
exclude their defaulting partners from trade relationship (cutting trade credits for example). In a sense,
trade is a collateral which relaxes partly borrowing constraints. As a consequence, bilateral trade affects
bilateral lending47.
3.2.3. An informational story?
In line with Portes and Rey (2005), a possible story could be based on information asymmetries:
because trading partners share information, the information flows through trade will enhance asset
stocks (and vice versa). In other words, because information flows (or social networks) positively
affect both cross-border finance and trade, trade in goods and trade in assets become in a sense
complementary: firmmanagers learn about each other by trading goods and/or securities. Therefore,
trading in the goods market reduces informational asymmetries in the financial markets (and vice
versa). We have plenty of anecdotal evidence where an exporting firm brings its financial
intermediary to help financing an investment plan of a potential client. We guess that the financial
intermediary can propose better credit terms because it can get private information from its exporting
client. As a consequence trade in goods enhances corporate financing. The apparent gravity structure
of asset trade would therefore rely mainly on information flows induced by trade in goods.
But whatever the story, we need to confirm our empirical result and especially address the
endogeneity problem to provide a precise quantification of those effects.
3.3. Instrumental variables estimation
3.3.1. Estimation strategy
To confirm the strength of the reciprocal effect of bilateral trade in goods on bilateral asset
holdings, we need to correct for endogeneity.
The empirical model we have to estimate is now the following simultaneous equations system
where international banking assets and international trade in goods are mutually determined48:
X  log AssetijGDPiGDPj
 
¼ aA þ /Alog
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
−bAlog Distij
 þ gAZ1Aij þ dARetj þ e1Aij
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
¼ aT þ /T log
Assetij
GDPiGDPj
 
−bT log Distij
 þ gTZ1Tij þ e1Tij
8>><
>>:46 In those models, the maximum sustainable lending is exactly the sanction value.
47 The reverse causality is not considered.
48 Under specification (1).
39A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51Two different empirical questions arise from this estimation:
• first, what is the effect of trade in goods on international banking claims (and vice versa)? In
other words, what are the elasticities ϕA and ϕT?
• second, once we have taken into account the endogeneity of trade in goods and
international banking assets, what is the independent effect of the geographical distance on
international asset portfolios and international trade in goods (i.e. what are the values of
βA and βT)?
We will consider those two questions separately.
3.3.2. What are the effects of trade in goods on international banking claims (and vice versa)?
3.3.2.1. Instrumentation methodology. In order to estimate the impact of trade in goods on
international asset holdings (and vice versa), we have to provide instruments for both dependent
variables. We do not need completely different instruments but at least a set of instruments that
affect both differently (or better: instruments that affect only one of our endogenous variables).
Indeed, the estimates of ϕA and ϕT should not depend on the instruments used as long as they are
valid instruments.
To instrument trade in goods, we could use distance and some other geographical
variables that are known to matter for bilateral trade in goods. However, since we do not
know a priori if distance matters for international portfolio allocation, we are exposed to
multicollinearity issues in the second-stage regression for asset holdings (remember that
distance is a very powerful determinant of trade in goods). We propose another identification
based on transport costs data: indeed, transport costs certainly affect trade in goods but
should not affect international asset holdings. Providing data on transport costs is a very
difficult task49 but we actually built a data set on bilateral transport costs, looking at the
bilateral cost of shipping a ton between the two main cities of the country pair using UPS
services50. We are aware that this variable is no more than an estimate of transport costs as
it is only airline freight (whereas the biggest part of goods transportation is sea freight or
truck freight). However, we argue that this variable is a good instrument since it is actually
a good predictor of goods trade and, which is the most important for our purpose, should be
independent of bilateral asset holdings. We finally restrict our set of instruments for bilateral
trade in goods to some geographical variables (excluding distance) and transport costs
data51.
We now have to provide variables that affect international asset holdings independently of
bilateral trade in goods. We argue that the fiscal and legal variables will provide reasonable
instruments for international banking claims (i.e. LegalSystemij, InterestTaxij, DividendTaxij,
FiscalTreatyij).
We decide to drop distance from both set of instruments to avoid multicollinearity problems in
the second stage but we will see that this choice has some consequence on the estimated
remaining impact of distance.49 Hummels (1999) gives estimates of transport costs but unfortunately only from the US point of view.
50 We compute the (log of the) cost per kg in USD.
51 Transport costs data are somewhat collinear to distance, but not too much: distance explains only 34% of its
variance.
40 A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51If Iij
A (resp. Iij
T) are the instruments for banking claims (resp. trade in goods), the First-Stage
Regression is the following:
log
Assetij
GDPiGDPj
 
rA þ /AIAij þ nAij
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
¼ rT þ /T ITij þ nTij
ϕA and ϕT are then estimated simply by plugging the predicted value of trade in goods (resp.
banking claims) in the second-stage regression.
3.3.2.2. Results. In our first specification (Table 5, Specification (1), third column)52, trade in
goods is instrumented by variables that we expect to be independent of banking assets, i.e.
geographical variables (excluding distance) and transport costs53:
ITij ¼ TransportCostij; ðTransportCostijÞ2;AreaiAreaj;LandLockij
n o
Respectively, banking assets are instrumented using fiscal and legal variables:
IAij ¼ LegalSystemij; InterestTaxij;Dividendtaxij; FiscalTreatyij
n o
The First-Stage regressions perform reasonably well suggesting that we do not have “weak”
instruments problems54. We provide exclusion tests (Sargan Tests) confirming the validity of our
instruments: our instruments for trade in goods are affecting asset holdings only through their
impact on trade in goods (and vice versa our instruments for asset holdings are not affecting
independently trade in goods).
ϕA and ϕT are found to be significant at standard levels. Trade patterns affect strongly
international asset holdings: the estimates of ϕA is remarkably high (around 0.7), which means
that a 10% increase in bilateral trade in goods induces a 7% increase in bilateral asset holdings.
Reciprocally, cross-border asset holdings between two countries affect positively their bilateral
trade although the effect is less strong (ϕT is estimated to be 0.24).
3.3.2.3. Robustness checks using different sets of instruments. In the previous specification, we
have estimated ϕA and ϕT using instruments that only affect one of the two endogenous
variables55; this specification is probably the most convincing although it is possible to use a
larger set of instruments and “exogenous” variables that might affect both endogenous variables.
We do it as a robustness check. We expand the set of instruments including all our set of
exogenous variable except bilateral distance.56 This specification allows us to catch a larger52 Estimates of control variables other than distance are not reported but available on request.
53 To take into account some non-linearities in the transport costs, we also use its square as an instrument.
54 The First-SLS gives an R2 of 0.29 for Tradeij/[GDPiGDPj] and 0.14 for Assetij/[GDPiGDPj]. First-SLS are not
reported but available on request.
55 There is no variable that is common instrument for both types of trade.
56 We still exclude distance from the set of instruments although including distance gives very comparable estimates.
The full set of instruments is then Iij
T= Iij
A⋃{TransportCostij(TransportCostij)2} where
IAij ¼
Corruptioni; Corruptionj; Languageij; ColonialDepij; Landlockij;
LegalSystemij; InterestTaxij; DividendTaxij; FiscalTreatyij; AreaiAreaj
 	
41A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51variability of asset holdings and trade in goods in the first-stage regression57. Our estimated
elasticities are roughly identical, highly significant, which confirms the two-way causality
between financial portfolios and trade in goods (see Table 5, Specification (1), fourth column).
3.3.2.4. Robustness checks with country fixed-effects. Controlling for importer-country fixed
effects almost does not change the estimated value of ϕA and ϕT
58 (Specification (2)). ϕA is still
remarkably high (around 0.6) and ϕT is consistently estimated between 0.2 and 0.3, which is
consistent with the previous estimates. Again, expanding the set of instruments does not change
the results (see Table 5, Specification (2), third and fourth columns).
Specification (3) raises some estimation difficulties due to the important number of
parameters that have to be estimated. Indeed, our main instrument for bilateral trade in goods,
i.e. data on bilateral transport costs is almost fully explained by exporter-country fixed effects
and bilateral distance59 which raises multicollinearity issues in the second step. To avoid this
problem, we propose to keep country i and country j fixed-effect in the trade regression since the
country j specific factors that matters for international trade in goods in the theoretical model are
indeed unobservable. In the asset regression where the multicollinearity problem is the most
stringent, we just keep country i fixed-effect and the observable variable that is found to matter
in the theoretical model (i.e. Retj). We also add a full set of regional dummies for capital
recipient countries in order to control as much as possible for unobservable regional factors of
capital importing countries. Again, our estimates confirm the previous results (Table 6).
3.3.2.5. Robustness checks using securities holdings. We propose exactly the same
identification methodology using a different data set on bilateral portfolio holdings: this data
set60 provided by the IMF geographically breaks down securities holdings. It gives the aggregate
bilateral portfolio stocks (including Equities, Long-term Debt Securities and Short-term Debt
Securities) in US$ for a large sample of countries in 2001; we restrict this data set to our sample of
importing countries (excluding Taiwan) and exporting countries. Those data include a larger part
of negotiable securities than the BIS database but exclude bank lending.
We redo the same regressionswith this newdata set on foreign capital stocks, using exactly the same
simultaneous equation set-up (and the same instrumentation methodology): the results confirm our
previous findings since we get remarkably similar estimates (Table 7). Asset Holdings and Goods
Trade are enhancing each other and the elasticities we have estimated with banking assets are very
stable. Those results with a different data set show the robustness of our findings.
3.3.3. What is the independent effect of geographical distance on international asset portfolios
and international trade in goods?
At this point, we are confident that bilateral asset holdings and bilateral trade in goods are
reinforcing each other. We are also reasonably convinced given the different robustness checks
that ϕA and ϕT are fairly well estimated.
We want to raise another issue: how does this misspecification in the standard gravity
equation bias the estimates of the control variables? Indeed, given the fact that distance might57 The First-SLS gives an R2 of 0.35 for Tradeij/[GDPiGDPj] and 0.32 for Assetij/[GDPiGDPj].
58 Although ϕA is a bit smaller.
59 Indeed, 90% of the variance of our transport cost variable is explained by country j fixed-effects and bilateral
distance.
60 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Data, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.
Table 6
Simultaneous gravity model for bilateral imports and banking assets under Spec. 3
Naive OLS System OLS Instrument set #1 Instrument set #2
Assets Trade Assets Trade Assets Trade Assets Trade
Specification 3 log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.305⁎⁎⁎
(0.061)
0.6⁎⁎⁎
(0.172)
0.659⁎⁎⁎ (0.183)
log
Assetsij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.186⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
0.341⁎⁎⁎
(0.074)
0.492⁎⁎⁎
(0.103)
log(Distij) −0.733⁎⁎⁎
(0.081)
−0.823⁎⁎⁎
(0.107)
−0.426⁎⁎⁎
(0.098)
−0.687⁎⁎⁎
(0.097)
−0.369⁎⁎⁎
(0.094)
−0.8⁎⁎⁎
(0.103)
−0.369⁎⁎⁎
(0.092)
−0.807⁎⁎⁎
(0.103)
Expected
bias
−0.224
(0.155)
−0.077
(0.045)
−0.26
(0.152)
−0.15
(0.032)
Sargan
Stat. a
2.786
(0.248)
2.114
(0.348)
4.515
(0.105)
0.635
(0.888)
N Obs. 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R2 0.03 0.728 0.717 0.746 0.583 0.738 0.584 0.739
Observations are clustered within destination country. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by ⁎
(resp. ⁎⁎ and ⁎⁎⁎).
a P-values in parenthesis.
42
A
.
A
viat,
N
.
C
oeurdacier
/
Journal
of
International
E
conom
ics
71
(2007)
22–51
Table 7
Simultaneous gravity model for bilateral imports and bilateral CPI assets
Naive OLS System OLS Instrument set #1
Assets Trade Assets Trade Assets Trade
Specification 1 log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.313⁎⁎⁎
(0.102)
0.663⁎⁎⁎
(0.172)
log
Assetsij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.082⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
0.128⁎⁎⁎
(0.059)
log(Distij) −0.592⁎⁎⁎
(0.079)
−0.678⁎⁎⁎
(0.066)
−0.349⁎⁎⁎
(0.129)
−0.633⁎⁎⁎
(0.066)
−0.315⁎⁎⁎
(0.109)
−0.647⁎⁎⁎
(0.068)
Expected bias −0.239
(0.173)
−0.039
(0.055)
N Obs. 999 999 999 999 999 999
R2 0.468 0.595 0.482 0.606 0.495 0.6
Specification 2 log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.252⁎⁎
(0.101)
0.679⁎⁎
(0.283)
log
Assetsij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.072⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
0.154⁎⁎
(0.062)
log(Distij) −0.58⁎⁎⁎
(0.083)
−0.657⁎⁎⁎
(0.06)
−0.41⁎⁎⁎
(0.123)
−0.626⁎⁎⁎
(0.06)
−0.34⁎⁎⁎
(0.133)
0.624⁎⁎⁎
(0.062)
Expected bias −0.245
(0.221)
−0.047
(0.055)
N Obs. 999 999 999 999 999 999
R2 0.578 0.677 0.585 0.685 0.594 0.684
Specification 3 log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.362⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
0.775⁎⁎⁎
(0.213)
log
Assetsij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.112⁎⁎⁎
(0.019)
0.266⁎⁎⁎
(0.059)
log(Distij) −0.703⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
−0.88⁎⁎⁎
(0.099)
−0.355⁎⁎⁎
(0.129)
−0.799⁎⁎⁎
(0.096)
−0.208
(0.148)
−0.848⁎⁎⁎
(0.095)
Expected bias −0.295
(0.184)
−0.081
(0.055)
N Obs. 999 999 999 999 999 999
R2 0.755 0.771 0.764 0.781 0.641 0.778
Observations are clustered within destination country. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by ⁎ (resp. ⁎⁎ and ⁎⁎⁎).
43A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51affect trade in goods through transport costs (resp. asset holdings through information costs),
we expect the impact of distance to be reduced once we control for the endogeneity of trade in
goods and asset holdings. But how large is the remaining impact of geographical distance on
asset holdings and trade in goods once endogeneity is controlled for? Especially, we would like
to know whether physical distance affects international portfolios on the top of its effect
through trade in goods. Technically, this is equivalent to give an estimate of βA (resp. βT) in the
model (Σ).
3.3.3.1. Estimating an upper-bound for the effect of distance on asset holdings (resp. on trade in
goods)61. It is important to consider that looking at the estimates of βA (resp. βT) in the second-
stage regression once we have instrumented trade in goods (resp. asset holdings) might be
misleading. Indeed, the estimates of βA and βT are not independent of the instruments used in the61 Technically, this is equivalent to estimate an upper bound for βA (resp. βT).
Trade in Goods Asset Holdings
Stock Markets Correlation
Fig. 2. A way to solve the “Correlation Puzzle”.
44 A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51first-stage regression. Assume for instance that trade in goods is instrumented by a variable that is
orthogonal to distance (and to asset holdings): in the second-stage regression, βA will still be
catching the effect of physical distance going through trade in goods (actually βA will exactly
estimate the global effect of distance on asset holdings whatever its cause).
The instruments we use are not orthogonal to distance but still looking at the estimate of βA in
the second-stage regression will just provide an upper-bound for the independent effect of
distance on asset holdings (as long as distance is not included in the set of instruments, see
appendix for a technical proof). Intuitively, when we drop distance from the set of instruments, we
give it the maximum chance to show up in the second-stage regression62.
Table 5 gives the estimates of βA (resp. βT) for the different sets of instruments
63. The
independent effect of distance on bilateral asset holdings is at most a reduction of 2% of banking
claims when distance increases by 10%: we reduce dramatically the effect of distance on asset
portfolios (the magnitude of the “distance puzzle” has been reduced by 60%) although such an
elasticity is far from being negligible. For trade in goods, we find an upper-bound for βT that is
equal to 0.69. We also provide estimates of the size of the bias on βA (resp. βT)
64. Given that the
estimated biases are barely significant, we cannot fully discard that geography matters for
international asset allocation on the top of its effect going through trade. However, these estimates
provide evidence that the “independent” effect of distance on asset holdings might be rather small
whereas its effect on bilateral imports remains quite large: its “independent” effect on trade flows
is at most reduced by around 20% compared to the OLS estimates of previous section.
Our robustness checks using country fixed-effects confirms those estimates. Moreover, when we
consider securities holdings instead of banking assets, we reproduce very similar estimates (seeTable 5,
Specification (2) and Tables 6 and 7). Using securities holdings, we find that the remaining effect of
distance on asset portfolios is slightly higher than for banking claims, indicating that information costs
might be larger for equities and corporate bonds than for bank lending.
In short, we get that an exogenous increase in bilateral trade in goods has a strong impact on
asset portfolios: a 10% leads to a 6% to 7% increase in bilateral asset holdings. This effect is robust
to many specifications and to the use of different types of assets (banking assets versus negotiable
securities). The reverse causality is also true but of a smaller magnitude. Once we control for trade
costs in goods markets, the remaining impact of geographical distance on asset holdings is much63 Under specifications (1) and (2), specification (3) is available in Table 6.
64 See technical appendix for the derivations of the bias on βA (resp. βT).
62 Adding distance in the set of instruments raises multicollinearity issues in the second-stage regression that cast doubt
on our estimate of βA and βT.
Table 8
Gravity models for banking claims, including bilateral exports and imports
Assetsij
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.369⁎⁎⁎ (0.115) 0.459⁎⁎⁎ (0.057) 0.421⁎⁎⁎ (0.1)
log
Assetsij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.174⁎⁎⁎ (0.079) 0.104⁎⁎⁎ (0.052) 0.177⁎⁎⁎ (0.065)
(Distij) −0.06 (0.105) −0.056 (0.087) −0.157⁎ (0.129)
N Obs. 977 977 977
R2 0.468 0.585 0.731
Observations are clustered within destination country. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by ⁎ (resp. ⁎⁎ and ⁎⁎⁎).
45A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51smaller: the elasticity of distance with respect to asset holdings is estimated between 0 and 0.2. The
distance-effect on bilateral imports has been slightly reduced but remains high and undisputable.
3.4. Back to the “correlation puzzle”
Adding trade in the regression does not solve the “correlation puzzle” we mentioned in the first
section. Indeed, we could have expected that this “correlation puzzle”was due to a misspecification
of the regression. Because business cycles are more correlated between trading partners (see Frankel
and Rose, 2002; Imbs, 2004), we could have expected that the correlation variable was spuriously
catching the effect of trade on cross-border asset holdings. As the “puzzle” remains once we control
for trade, this intuition is not confirmed by the data. Indeed, we still find that portfolios are biased
towards countries whose assets are close substitutes to the domestic ones and the estimated impact of
the bilateral correlation on bilateral asset holdings is close to the previous OLS-estimates65.
We think that the “correlation puzzle” comes from an estimation bias in the regression. Indeed,
stock market correlation may be endogenous, and adding it roughly in the regression may be
inappropriate. There is very few empirical (and theoretical) work that takes the correlation of
returns66 as endogenous. However we have good reasons to think that it is the case: with
“dynamic portfolio rebalancing”, Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2004) generates endogenous
comovements of stock prices between markets and those comovements are more pronounced
when financial frictions between markets are low. In other words, well integrated financial
markets should exhibit higher correlation of their stock markets, which enhances the probability
of simultaneously observing high correlations of returns and high levels of cross-border asset
holdings. To correct for this endogeneity bias, one should be able to find an instrument of the
correlation of stock markets that is exogenous to the degree of integration between financial
markets. Since we are not able to provide such a valid instrument, we must admit that, at this
point, there is no evidence that diversification matters for asset allocation and restoring the
standard predictions of the portfolio choice literature is left for future research (Fig. 2).
3.5. Testing competing theories
We provide convincing empirical results arguing that a reduction of frictions on international
goods markets enhances bilateral asset holdings (and vice versa). One can see our empirical65 The effect is slightly lower: the coefficient is estimated between 0.6 and 1.2 and significant at standard levels.
Estimates available on request.
66 Imbs (2004) is a notable exception even if he does not consider the impact of the correlation on effective bilateral flows.
Table 9
Simultaneous gravity model for bilateral imports and bilateral banking claims, emerging versus developed countries
Naive OLS System OLS Instrument set #1 Instrument set #2
Assets Trade Assets Trade Assets Trade Assets Trade
Developed
countries
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.488⁎⁎⁎
(0.092)
0.615⁎⁎⁎
(0.075)
0.664⁎⁎⁎
(0.094)
log
Assetsij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.151⁎⁎⁎
(0.031)
0.035
(0.089)
0.109
(0.12)
log(Distij) −0.58⁎⁎⁎
(0.074)
−0.707⁎⁎⁎
(0.096)
−0.164
(0.109)
−0.623⁎⁎⁎
(0.087)
−0.206⁎⁎
(0.09)
−0.0704⁎⁎⁎
(0.098)
−0.213⁎⁎
(0.088)
−0.698⁎⁎⁎
(0.099)
Expected bias −0.15 (0.167) −0.016
(0.032)
−0.198
(0.17)
−0.052
(0.032)
N Obs. 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 452
R2 0.513 0.661 0.564 0.683 0.553 0.662 0.559 0.663
Emerging
countries
log
Importij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.318⁎⁎⁎
(0.077)
0.548⁎⁎⁎
(0.138)
0.59⁎⁎⁎
(0.155)
log
Assetsij
GDPiGDPj
 
0.193⁎⁎⁎
(0.05)
0.503⁎⁎⁎
(0.186)
0.684⁎⁎⁎
(0.221)
log(Distij) −0.327⁎⁎⁎
(0.101)
−0.714⁎⁎⁎
(0.122)
−0.128
(0.098)
−0.647⁎⁎⁎
(0.125)
−175⁎⁎⁎
(0.11)
−0.655⁎⁎⁎
(0.135)
−0.183⁎
(0.109)
−0.656⁎⁎⁎
(0.131)
Expected bias −0.192
(0.105)
−0.116
(0.055)
−0.227
(0.095)
−0.181
(0.045)
N Obs. 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525
R2 0.274 0.369 0.317 0.409 0.309 0.387 0.307 0.39
Observations are clustered within destination countries. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by ⁎
(resp. ⁎⁎ and ⁎⁎⁎).
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47A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51results on the two-way relationship between asset holdings and trade in goods as a necessity to
consider the interaction between trade and finance in a common theoretical set-up. We do not
pretend to submit a full theory explaining what we observed in the data but we try to give some
new empirical results that might be a helpful guidance for future theoretical works on this issue.
Even if it is difficult to test properly with our data the different stories we gave in Section 3.2,
one way to confirm Obstfeld and Rogoff's (2000) theory would be based on the different roles
played by imports and exports in their model; indeed, only trade costs on imports matter for
bilateral asset stocks: agents want to hedge their consumption basket and bias their portfolio
towards securities of countries from which they import goods. Then, as long as bilateral imports
and bilateral exports are not completely symmetrical (which is the case), we should expect that
import patterns are the main determinant of geographical portfolio holdings.
We do a regression for bilateral financial assets including bilateral imports and bilateral exports
and, surprisingly, exports are the main determinant of portfolio holdings (Table 8): of course, we
should be cautious with this result as we cannot address the endogeneity problem with those two
variables (because we do not have different instruments). However, the results are quite appealing
and reveal that their story might not be the whole story.
Rose and Spiegel (2002) story is very attractive, but it is hard to believe that sovereign risk is a
major concern for industrialized countries. Indeed, we find that the effect of bilateral trade on asset
holdings is even larger for rich countries than for emerging countries (Table 9).
4. Conclusion
We bridge two strands of literature: international trade in goods on the one hand and international
asset portfolios on the other. Numerous papers have shown that international trade in goods can be
very well described by gravity models and some recent papers have pointed out that international
asset portfolios could also be described by this kind of models: if the distance between two countries
doubles, bilateral asset holdings are almost divided by two. This far from negligible impact seems
somewhat puzzling, since geography should not shape asset trade in a globalized world.
Portes and Rey (2005) justifies the impact of distance on asset flows by information costs,
distance acting as a proxy for the informational asymmetries. We chose here to investigate another
idea, namely that trade in goods and asset holdings are mutually reinforcing. The strong impact of
distance on asset holdings is the consequence of the complementarity between trade in goods and
trade in assets.
Using bilateral data on international trade flows and international banking claims, we have
examined what remained of the effect of distance once we take into account the fact that trade in
goods and bilateral financial claims are mutually determined. The set of instruments we use to
identify the system is a crucial aspect of this study. We have used geographical variables and new
data on transport costs to instrument trade in goods. To instrument asset holdings, we followed La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and used data on legal environments; to the standard legal environment
data, we added a set of variables we built, which describe some aspects of the bilateral fiscal
relationships between countries (bilateral withholding taxes on dividends and interests, and fiscal
agreements). This methodology allows us to estimate precisely the effect of bilateral trade in goods
on bilateral asset holdings: this effect is found to be quantitatively important since a 10% increase
in bilateral imports lead to a 6% to 7% increase in bilateral asset holdings. Bilateral asset holdings
also enhance trade in goods but the latter effect is found to be much smaller.
Our results show that only trade in goods has an undisputable gravity structure, i.e. a structure
in which distance (understood as a proxy for transportation and transaction costs) is a major
48 A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51determinant. The system we have estimated shows that distance affects asset holdings mainly
through its impact on trade in goods: in the asset part of the system, the magnitude of the distance
puzzle is at least reduced by 60%.
The existing scenarios (Obstfeld and Rogoff's consumption hedging, Rose's sovereign risk)
cannot be formally eliminated so far, even if we have shown that some of our results cast doubt on
each one of them. Another story based on common transaction costs on financial markets and
goods markets could be a more natural match to our result. For example, in line with Portes and
Rey's paper, it might be that both trade in assets and trade in goods are subject to some common
information costs making trade in goods and trade in assets complementary. Those information
spillovers (from goods markets to financial markets) would need to be very large to have the
observed effects but we do think that this explanation is a large part of the story. However, we do
not pretend to provide a full-fletched theory of what we point out in the data. The robustness and
the strength of our empirical results shed light on the necessity to model trade and financial
linkages together. It is a new challenge for the economic theory.
Furthermore, our framework leads to another puzzle: the higher the correlation between two
countries stock returns, the larger the volume of asset trading between the two. This result still
holds true once we control for trade in goods. This reinforces the need for a theoretical study on
the interactions between trade in goods, trade in assets and diversification.
Finally, these results raise some interesting questions about the coherence of liberalization
policies. We show in this paper that trade in goods and in assets reinforce each other. Trade
policies and capital account liberalization cannot be considered independently. Therefore, these
policies should be thought of by policymakers in a common and single perspective.
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Appendix A. Data
A.1. Data sources
• Bilateral exports and imports: in 2001, in US dollars from the CHELEM data set (Cenres
d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales, CEPII, Paris).
• Bilateral financial banking assets: in US dollars, average over quarterly data in 2001, from the
Bank of International Settlements.
• Bilateral securities holdings: in US dollars, in 2001, from the Coordinated Portfolio
Investment Survey, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.
• GDP and population: from the International Financial Statistics (GDP in US dollars in 2001,
exchange rates used are also from the IFS).
• Bilateral distance: in km, from S-J Wei's website and from various sources (“How far is it ?”,
http://www.indo.com/distance).
• Transportation costs: cost of shipping a ton between the two main cities of two countries (in
USD, per kg) with UPS. From UPS websites of the different source countries.
49A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51• Other geography variables: various sources (especially A. Rose's website).
• Trade agreements: various sources (especially A. Rose's website).
• Corruption: “Corruption Perception Index” from Transparency International67 ranking from 0
to 10 (actually we use the opposite of the standard index to have the maximum value for the
most corrupted country).
• Common language and colonial link: various sources (for colonial link, mainly summaries of
country history in Encyclopedias).
• Legal variable: mainly La Porta et al. (1998), various sources for missing countries.68
• Fiscal variables: IBFD online products (http://www.ibfd.org); Latin American Taxation
Database, European Taxation Database, Asia-Pacific Taxation Database, Tax Treaties Database.
• Stock market returns: monthly data from 1990 to 2000 in USD dollars from Martin and Rey
(2002) (World Bank and Bloomberg) and Global Financial Data.
A.2. Geographical sample
• Importer countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United
Kingdom, United States;
• Exporter countries:
• Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Poland,
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey;
• Asia and Oceania: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand;
• Oceania: Australia, New Zealand;
• North America: Canada, United States;
• South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela;
• Central America: Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama;
• Africa: Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia.
Appendix B. Estimating an upper-bound for the effect of distance on asset holdings (resp.
on trade in goods)
Let us consider the following model where {A, T, D, ZA, ZT} respectively denote bilateral asset
holdings, bilateral import of goods, bilateral distance and the control variables of asset holdings
and bilateral import of goods:
A ¼ /AT þ bADþ gAZA þ uA
We refer to this model as the “true model”. The first-stage regression is the following:
T ¼ uT IT þ nT ¼ Tˆ þ nT
where IT is the set of instruments for T and Tˆ is its predicted value.67 http://www.transparency.org.
68 http://www.llrx.com.
50 A. Aviat, N. Coeurdacier / Journal of International Economics 71 (2007) 22–51Let us now consider the “true model” for asset holdings and its 2SLS-estimated counterpart.
A ¼ /AT þ bADþ gAZA þ uA ¼ /A
ˆ
Tˆ þ bA
ˆ
Dþ gA
ˆ
ZA þ uˆA
Projecting on the vectorial space orthogonal to ZA
bˆA−bA
 
P⊥ZAD ¼ ð/A−/A
ˆ ÞðP⊥ZA TˆÞ þ /AP⊥ZAnT−uA
ˆ þ uA
and taking the covariance with distance leads to69:
bˆA−bA
 
covðP⊥ZAD;DÞ ¼ ð/A−/A
ˆ ÞcovðP⊥ZA Tˆ ;DÞ þ /AcovðP⊥ZAnT ;DÞ þ covðuA;DÞ
As far as D is “exogenous” it is orthogonal to the structural disturbances uA; one then gets the
expected bias of the estimated βˆA and the variance of βˆA−βA:70
E bA
ˆ
−bA
 
¼ /AcoυðP
⊥
ZA
nT ;DÞ
covðP⊥ZAD;DÞ
V bA
ˆ
−bA
 
¼ V ð/A
ˆ
−/AÞcoυ2ðP⊥ZA Tˆ ;DÞ þ V ðuAÞV ðDÞ=N
coυ2ðP⊥ZAD;DÞ
This procedure is valid for any proper set of instruments IT. A simple calculus of the right-hand
side of the bias' expression gives an estimate of the magnitude of the bias. Note that when
distance is included in the set of instruments: cov(ξT, D)=0 and the bias is expected to be zero.
However, given the strong predictive power of bilateral distance on goods trade, adding distance
in the set of instruments raises multicollinearity issues in the second step. Theoretically, this
expression of the bias does not give information on its sign but empirically cov(ξi, D) (i∈{A, T})
is found to be negative: βˆA (resp. βˆT) gives an upper-bound of the true effect of distance on asset
holdings (resp. trade in goods).
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